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A Window into the Regulated
Commons: The Takings Clause,
Investment Security, and Sustainability
Josh Eagle*
The holding of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in
American Pelagic Fishing Co. v. United States points to the conclusion
that the government will almost never be liable, under the Takings
Clause, when fisheries regulations reduce the value of commercial fishing
permits, vessels, or gear. From the perspective of natural resource
economics, this is a healthy result. Economists suggest that solving
commons problems requires that natural resources be under the complete
control of a sole owner who makes self-interested decisions about
resource use, and if the Fifth Amendment required the government
owner to compensate fishermen when it tightened regulations, it would
hamper the government's ability to regulate optimally. One problem with
the economic theory of commons solution, however, is that it does not
distinguish between sole private ownership and sole government
ownership in terms of their application. In this Article, I argue that
government ownership is fraught with problems that do not occur in the
private ownership context. To the extent that government resource
owners rely on entrepreneurs to capture and sell natural resources, the
government must play two roles. regulator and facilitator. These roles
frequently come into conflict, inevitably compromising the effectiveness
of regulation. Furthermore, entrepreneurs have incentives to lobby
against long-term conservation. The poor condition of United States
fisheries is proof that these two problems -government's dual role and
fishermen's lobbying-are preventing the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery
Conservation and Management Act from achieving its goal of sustainable
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fisheries. Until the Act is changed to reduce both fishermen's incentive to
lobby against conservation and the likelihood that regulators will accede
to their demands, it will probably not succeed.
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INTRODUCTION
The Takings Clause fascinates scholars.' Shepardizing Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council,2 for example, reveals that law review authors
have cited that regulatory takings case in more than 2,100 articles-an
average of about 140 times per year-in the fifteen years since it was
decided.3 Law reviews and journals published seventy-six articles on the
eminent domain case of Kelo v. City of New London4 in the year and a
1. The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides: "nor
shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend.
V.
2. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
3. Lexis "Shepard's" search performed on March 7, 2007. During the same period, federal
and state courts combined have cited to the case about half as many times. Id.
4. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
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half after the Supreme Court issued its opinion in the matter.5 Many first-
year property law casebooks devote more pages to takings and eminent
domain than they do to the arguably more practical subjects of landlord-
tenant law or real estate transfers.6
Some of this extraordinary preoccupation can be attributed to a
perceived need for expanding the twelve words of the Takings Clause
into a set of workable rules.' Laws regulate the use of real and personal
property, states and cities condemn land, and disputes arise between the
government and property owners. Although the Supreme Court at
present is comfortable with "essentially ad hoc factual inquiries"8 into
allegations of regulatory takings and a "boundlessly broad" definition of
"public use," 9 many scholars are not.1" Avowedly in pursuit of efficiency,
fairness, or fidelity to the Constitution, scholars have repeatedly taken up
the challenge of forging clearer guiding precepts."
Because the Takings Clause is at the same time so important and so
succinct, any effort to evolve it into rules invites-and indeed
necessitates-conversation about a larger issue: what Richard Epstein
calls "the proper relationship between the individual and the state."' 2
Thus, many takings articles that begin as analyses of particular cases
quickly turn to discussions of the purposes of private property as an
5. Lexis search performed on March 7, 2007. This count only includes articles with the
word "Kelo" in their title. The case has been cited in nearly 300 articles since it was decided.
6. See, e.g., DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY (6th ed. 2006). That casebook contains 124
pages of materials on takings law, 107 pages on real estate transfers, and 84 pages on landlord-
tenant law.
The public appears to be equally interested in the Fifth Amendment's limitation on
government regulation and confiscation of private property, especially in the context of eminent
domain. Major U.S. newspapers combined have published over 680 articles referencing the Kelo
decision since June of 2005. Lexis search performed on March 7, 2007. Even more revealing is
the fact that all forty-four state legislatures meeting in 2006 considered the issue of eminent
domain reform and twenty-eight of them passed some type of "anti-Kelo" legislation. Nat'l
Conf. of State Legislatures, Eminent Domain: 2006 Legislation, http://www.ncsl.orglprogramsl
natres/emindomainleg06.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2007).
7. For a partial catalog of these efforts, see Marc R. Poirier, The Virtue of Vagueness in
Takings Doctrine, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 93, 97 (2002).
8. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
9. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 514 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
10. Poirier, supra note 7. Poirier himself is content with the absence of clear rules. Id.
11. Id
12. Richard A. Epstein describes his book, Takings.- Private Property and the Power of
Eminent Domain, as
an extended essay about the proper relationship between the individual and the state.
The specific vehicle for examining this question is the eminent domain (or takings)
clause of the Constitution .... The problem to which the eminent domain clause is
directed is that of political obligation and organization. What are the reasons for the
formation of the state? What can the state demand of the individual citizens whom it
both governs and represents?
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 3
(1985).
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institution, of property owners' obligations to their neighbors, of
relationships between majorities and minorities in a constitutional
democracy, and of the role of government in ordering these
relationships. 13
In keeping with this paradigm, this Article takes a recent regulatory
takings case, American Pelagic Fishing Co. v. United States,4 as an
13. See, e.g., Hope M. Babcock, Should Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council Protect
Where the Wild Things Are? Of Beavers, Bob-o-Links. and Other Things that Go Bump in the
Night, 85 IOWA L. REV. 849 (2000); Eric R. Claeys, The Penn Central Test and Tensions in
Liberal Property Theory, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 339 (2006); Alberto B. Lopez, Weighing and
Reweighing Eminent Domain's Political Philosophies Post-Kelo, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 237
(2006); Gregory Daniel Page, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council and Justice Scalia's
Primer on Property Rights: Advancing New Democratic Traditions by Defending the Tradition
of Property, 24 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 161 (2000); Timothy Sandefur, Mine and
Thine Distinct. What Kelo Says About Our Path, 10 CHAP. L. REV. 1 (2006); Joseph L. Sax,
Property Rights and the Economy of Nature: Understanding Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1433 (1993).
14. Am. Pelagic Fishing Co. v. United States (American Pelagic II), 379 F.3d 1363 (Fed.
Cir. 2004). This decision overturned two prior decisions by the Court of Federal Claims, one on
liability, American Pelagic Fishing Co. v. United States (American Pelagic 1), 49 Fed. C1. 36
(2001), and one on damages, American Pelagic Fishing Co. v. United States (American Pelagic
I), 55 Fed. Cl. 575 (2003).
American Pelagic is one of the most recent in a line of takings cases arising out of
government regulation of natural resource use in former commons. There are two contexts in
which these "former commons" takings cases frequently arise. First, they arise in the context of
government regulation of fisheries. See. e.g., Conti v. United States, 291 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir.
2002) (holding the banning of gillnet fishing did not constitute a regulatory taking); Arctic King
Fisheries, Inc. v. United States, 59 Fed. Cl. 360 (2004) (holding no cognizable property interest in
a vessel's qualification to fish under federal regulations); Burns Harbor Fish Co. v. Ralston, 800
F. Supp. 722 (S.D. Ind. 1992) (finding ban on gillnet fishing did not qualify as unconstitutional
taking); Organized Fishermen of Fla. v. Watt, 590 F. Supp. 805 (S.D. Fla. 1984) (finding no
takings claim where regulations eliminated the harvesting of certain shellfish, established bag
limits, and eliminated certain commercial fishing). Second, they arise in the context of
government regulation of grazing on the public lands. See, e.g., Fed. Lands Legal Consortium v.
United States, 195 F.3d 1190 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding change in grazing permit regulations is not
a taking because permit holder has no property interest in permit); Pankey Land & Cattle Co. v.
Hardin, 427 F.2d 43 (10th Cir. 1970) (holding that since the government grants grazing permits,
the permit holder has no compensable property interest when the government takes the permits
away); United States v. Cox, 190 F.2d 293 (10th Cir. 1951) (holding that a jury cannot consider
access to public lands and grazing permits when determining the value of contiguous land);
Osborne v. United States, 145 F.2d 892 (9th Cir. 1944) (holding that when land is taken and
compensation determined, a grazing permit for a contiguous National Forest has no value);
Klump v. United States, 30 F. App'x 958 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (finding no compensable property right
in grazing permits); Sacramento Grazing Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 66 Fed. Cl. 211 (2005)
(finding that a grazing permit on public land is not a property interest compensable under the
Takings Clause); Colvin Cattle Co. v. United States, 67 Fed. Cl. 568 (2005) (finding that a change
in value of plaintiffs" ranch due to a change in plaintiffs' grazing rights is not a compensable
taking); Hage v. United States, 51 Fed. Cl. 570 (2002) (finding no valid property interest in
grazing permits for the purpose of a takings claim); Bradshaw v. United States, 47 Fed. Cl. 549
(2000) (finding no taking where the government cancelled a grazing permit, the plaintiffs had
historical grazing preference on federal land, or the government failed to prevent feral horses
from destroying plaintiffs" land and land on which they held a grazing permit); White Sands
Ranchers of New Mexico v. United States, 16 Cl. Ct. 13 (1988) (upholding the conclusion that
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invitation to discuss the problematic relationship between fishermen 5
and the government in the context of marine fisheries. 6 The relationship
between fishermen and government is problematic because of the dual
role that government must play after it opts to regulate certain kinds of
common-pool resources, or "commons.' 1 7 First, the government must
limit resource use. Economic theory posits that tragedies of the commons
can only be solved when a single owner-the government or a private
entity-takes control of resource use, internalizing what had been
externalities in the unregulated commons. 8 At the same time as it
grazing rights do not constitute property for the purpose of the takings clause); McKinley v.
United States, 828 F. Supp. 888 (D.N.M. 1993) (finding grazing reduction that reduces the value
of contiguous property is not a compensable taking).
15. In this paper, the terms "fisherman" and "fishermen" are meant to be gender neutral.
Although many authors use the term "fishers," my personal experience is that both men and
women who fish prefer to be called "fishermen." For example, Linda Greenlaw, made famous by
her role in the book and film The Perfect Storm, see infra note 24, refers to herself on her
website as a "fisherman." Linda Greenlaw, http://www.fishingwithlinda.net/author/author.asp
(last visited Mar. 15, 2007).
16. The term "fishery" refers to the people and equipment involved in catching fish in a
defined area, as well as the fish that are pursued. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1802(13) (2006) (including
in the definition of "fishery" the factors that define a fish stock).
17.
A common-pool resource, such as a lake or ocean, an irrigation system, a fishing
ground, a forest, or the atmosphere, is a natural or man-made resource from which it
is difficult to exclude or limit users once the resource is provided, and one person's
consumption of resource units makes those units unavailable to others .... Thus, the
trees or fish harvested by one user are not available for others. The difficulty of
excluding beneficiaries is a characteristic that is shared with public goods, and the
subtractability of the resource units is shared with private goods ....
Elinor Ostrom, Coping with Tragedies of the Commons, 2 ANN. REV. POL. SC. 493, 497-98
(1999). The "certain kinds" of resources to which I refer are those that are in a condition
warranting continued use and for which commercial demand exists, such as timber, grazing
forage, and marine fish. In other words, the specific problems I describe here are not
characteristic of the management of resources that are depleted to the point where government's
interest is in preservation or restoration only, for example, endangered wildlife.
18.
Common-property natural resources are free goods for the individual and scarce
goods for society. Under unregulated private exploitation, they can yield no rent; that
can be accomplished only by methods which make them private property or public
(government) property, in either case subject to a unified directing power.
H. Scott Gordon, The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery, 62 J.
POL. ECON. 124, 135 (1954).
The common pool problem begins with the simple idea that the efficient
intertemporal allocation of resources requires that any decision on the current rate of
use takes into account the entailments for future supplies. A "sole owner" (controller)
of a resource who has perpetual tenure is motivated to do just that. He must live with
the future consequences of his own current decisions. . . .There is no reason in
principle why a state planning authority cannot mimic the responsible behavior of a
privately motivated sole owner.
PHILIP A. NEHER, NATURAL RESOURCE ECONOMICS: CONSERVATION AND EXPLOITATION
256 (1990).
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regulates use, the government must encourage private investment in
resource extraction enterprises. Unlike a private owner, the
government-at least in the United States-is not interested in entering
into resource markets as a competitor. 9 Thus, the government must
encourage fishermen to fish and ranchers to graze their cattle; it must
regulate in such a way that it attracts, or at least does not repel,
entrepreneurs.'z
Simultaneously playing these two roles-regulator and facilitator-
makes it difficult for the government to manage resources sustainably for
two reasons. 1 First, the regulator's conservation decision, such as, a
decision to reduce the amount of fish available to fishermen during the
next fishing season, may be contrary to the facilitator's interest in
attracting and retaining investment in the fishery. The regulator's
decision may or may not drive fishermen out of business, but it can
certainly reduce their incomes in the short term. To the extent that
"government-as-facilitator" deters "government-as-regulator" from
making necessary conservation rules, the likelihood of sustainable
management is reduced. Second, by inviting entrepreneurs to use the
commons, the government owner is sowing the seeds of a lobbying
interest that will likely push against restrictive conservation rules if and
when they are needed. Unless the government enters into some type of
long-term agreement with resource entrepreneurs, their likely incentive
will be to recapture their initial investments as quickly as possible.2 It is
well documented how resource users, motivated by this incentive, will
organize to lobby for lax regulation that eventually leads to poor
conservation outcomes.23 These two aspects of government ownership
19. The nationalized natural resource industry is mainly a phenomenon of the developing
world. See Darryl Reed, Resource Extraction Industries in Developing Countries, 39 J. Bus.
ETHICS 199 (2004).
20. User-friendly regulation can take a variety of forms, from the active (subsidies) to the
passive (non-enforcement of rules and regulations). See, e.g., Josh Eagle et al., Why Farm
Salmon Outcompete Fishery Salmon, 28 MARINE POL'Y 259 (2004); Josh Eagle & Barton H.
Thompson Jr., Answering Lord Perry's Question: Dissecting Regulatory Overfishing, 46 OCEAN
& COASTAL MGMT. 649 (2003).
21. Although it is a contested term, the most frequently cited definition of "sustainability"
is the Brundtland Commission's: resource management that "meets the needs of the present
generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs."
Martin L. Weitzman, Sustainability and Technical Progress, 99 SCAND. J. ECON. 1, 1 (1997)
(citing WORLD COMM'N ON ENV'T & DEV., OUR COMMON FUTURE (1987)).
22. James E. Wilen, Why Fisheries Management Fails: Treating Symptoms Rather than the
Cause, 78 BULL. MARINE So. 529 (2006).
23. See, e.g., Timothy Hennessey & Michael Healey, Ludwig's Ratchet and the Collapse of
New England Groundfish Stocks, 28 COASTAL MGMT. 187 (2000). Mancur Olson presented the
theory underlying this phenomenon in his classic work, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION:
PUBLIC GOOD AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (2d ed. 1971). Christopher Schroeder provides a
good summary of Olson's theory:
[Vol. 34:619
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create a synergy: the chances of lobbying success are increased by the fact
that government-as-facilitator is sympathetic to fishermen's financial
concerns.
The holding in American Pelagic is an exclamation point following
the proposition that the government's right to vitiate fishermen's
investments through regulation is absolute. As described further below, it
is hard to imagine a case in which a takings plaintiff, in the regulated
commons context, would have better facts. Yet even this "perfect
storm" 4 of facts was not enough.25 Like other takings cases, however,
American Pelagic provides only a narrow window into the relationship
between individuals and the state. Viewed through this window, insofar
as it confirms government's ability to regulate without concern for cost,
American Pelagic appears to be a victory for conservation. 6 The obverse
Arguing that most people would approach the decision to contribute or not by
weighing the costs and benefits, Olson predicted that groups would be hard to
organize when the group activity promised to produce benefits that were spread
out among beneficiaries in amounts that are small compared to the costs of
securing them. Each individual would see that her contribution to the group
effort was not going to affect her own personal fortunes-either others would
contribute enough so that she could free-ride on their efforts or others would not
contribute and the minimal amount she was willing to contribute would not put
the effort over the top. In either case, no benefits to her would be produced by
her contribution, and hence it would be irrational to join in the group effort.
Groups whose benefits were diffuse in this sense were labeled "latent" groups
by Olson because the shared group benefit was likely to remain unrealized. In
contrast, groups that contain members with more concentrated benefits would be
more likely to organize, either because a single member has enough at stake in
the benefit to underwrite individually the costs of securing the group benefit, or
because a subgroup of members within the larger group is small enough so that
they can effectively agree to pool sufficient resources to produce the benefit.
Compared to latent groups, such groups as these have a comparative advantage
with respect to their ability to organize to advance group interests.
Christopher H. Schroeder, Rational Choice Versus Republican Moment-Explanations for
Environmental Laws, 1969-73,9 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 29, 33-34 (1998).
24. Sebastian Junger's THE PERFECT STORM (1997) documented the fate of several fishing
vessels caught in a storm event on the Flemish Cap in the northwestern Atlantic in October of
1991. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration called this event "the perfect
storm" because it was brought about by the mix of several rarely combining weather
phenomena. NOAA Satellite & Info. Serv., The Perfect Storm, Oct. 1991,
http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/satellite/satelliteseye/cyclones/pfctstorm9l/pfctstorm.html (last
visited Mar. 24, 2007). A film of Junger's book was released in 2000. THE PERFECT STORM
(Baltimore Spring Creek Productions 2000).
25. It was already clear, prior to American Pelagic, that plaintiffs faced steep uphill battles
in regulated commons takings cases. As Laitos and Westfall put it, "[a] warning of 'grantee
beware' should therefore be considered by all would-be interest holders of public property." Jan
G. Laitos & Richard A. Westfall, Government Interference with Private Interests in Public
Resources, 11 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 75 (1987).
26. As is true with respect to other takings cases, the dispute in American Pelagic can
easily be framed as a struggle between resource exploitation and conservation. See, e.g., Michael
C. Blumm, The End of Environmental Law?: Libertarian Property Natural Law, and the Just
Compensation Clause in the Federal Circuit, 25 ENVTL. L. 171 (1995); Mark W. Cordes, The
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of the American Pelagic holding, though, is that fishermen have no legal
security for their investments in vessels and fishing equipment. 7 Evidence
of overuse and overinvestment in a significant percentage of U.S.
fisheries raises the concern that fishermen are protecting their
investments by successfully lobbying against conservation regulations.28 If
this is true, as I hope to show below, it calls into question whether
American Pelagic represents a meaningful marine conservation victory.
Furthermore, if this hypothesis is correct, there are implications for
U.S. fisheries law and policy. The dismal statistics on overuse and
overinvestment in U.S. fisheries indicate that the United States' principal
fisheries law-the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and
Management Act29-is not succeeding in its stated goal of achieving
sustainable fisheries.30 It may well be that the Act will not succeed until it
Effect of Palazzolo v. Rhode Island on Takings and Environmental Land Use Regulation, 43
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 337 (2003); Courtney Harrington, Penn Central to Palazzolo: Regulatory
Takings Decisions and Their Implications for the Future of Environmental Regulation, 15 TUL.
ENVTL. L.J. 383 (2002); James M. Olson & David E. Pierson, Takings In Michigan: Private
Property and Environmental Protection, 2 MICH. L. & POL'Y REV. 261 (1997); Andrew H.
Sawyer, Changing Landscapes and Evolving Law Lessons from Mono Lake on Takings and the
Public Trust, 50 OKLA. L. REV. 311 (1997). If courts interpreted the Fifth Amendment to protect
fishing investments, so the argument goes, it would hinder regulators' desire and ability to act as
rational resource owners by making necessary conservation decisions costly.
Members of Congress who supported the regulation challenged in the case framed it as a
measure necessary for protection of the environment. For example, Senator Olympia Snowe (R-
ME) explained her position with a reference to the poor condition of fisheries generally: "We
must avoid repeating the mistakes of the past in fisheries management .... Many of the major
commercial fisheries in both the United States and the world are either fully exploited or
overexploited." Letitia Baldwin, Congress OKs trawler moratorium: Bill would protect region's
herring, mackerel fisheries, BANGOR DAILY NEWS (MAINE), Nov. 14, 1997. Similarly,
Congressman William Delahunt (D-Mass) argued that the measure would prevent the
"alarmingly real" possibility that herring, mackerel, and groundfish stocks would be
"devastate[ed]." Chris Black, Lawmakers rush to protect herring fishery in Atlantic, BOSTON
GLOBE, Sept. 30, 1997, at Al.
27. As Justice Kennedy noted in his concurring opinion in Lucas, "The Takings Clause ...
protects private expectations to ensure private investment." Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505
U.S. 1003, 1035 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
28. Nearly 30 percent of U.S. fisheries are "overfished," while more than half are
"overcapitalized." WILLIAM T. HOGARTH, NAT'L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., ASST.
ADM'R FOR FISHERIES, NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE'S REPORT ON THE STATUS OF
THE U.S. FISHERIES FOR 2004 (2004) [hereinafter STATUS OF THE U.S. FISHERIES FOR 2004],
available at http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/sfa/domes-fish/StatusoFisheries/StatusReport2004.pdf;
NAT'L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., UNITED STATES NATIONAL PLAN OF ACTION FOR THE
MANAGEMENT OF FISHING CAPACITY 11-12 (2004), available at http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/
sfa/reg-svcs/npoa.capacity.8.4.04.pdf. "Overfished" fisheries are those in which stocks have been
fished beyond an optimal point; "overcapitalized" fisheries are those in which fishermen, as a
group, have invested in fishing equipment that is not necessary for catching the amount of fish
available. Part IV contains a more complete discussion of the data and these issues.
29. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1883 (2006) [hereinafter Magnuson-Stevens Act].
30. The sustainability goals of the Act are captured in Congress' statement of "Findings,
purposes, and policy": "to prevent overfishing, to rebuild overfished stocks, to insure
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takes into account the differences -between public and private resource
management: the government owner's "split personality" and the
predictable influence of short-sighted resource entrepreneurs on
management decisions.
Part I of this Article recounts the facts of American Pelagic and its
holding that, as a legal matter, the U.S. government owns the fishery
resources of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and fishermen cannot
use the Fifth Amendment to protect their investments in fishing vessels
and gear. Part II explores the theory and practice of government
ownership: how the need for private entrepreneurs to capture resources
affects economists' "sole ownership" solution to the tragedy of the
commons. Part III explains how the Magnuson-Stevens Act and other
federal fisheries laws have likely exacerbated the problems created by the
presence of entrepreneurs within government-owned fisheries. Part IV
examines how Congress might amend the Magnuson-Stevens Act to
address these problems and thus increase the likelihood that the law will
achieve its stated goal of sustainability. Part V concludes by briefly noting
the obstacles to change.
I. AMERICANPELA GICFISHING CO. V UNITED STATES THE PERFECT STORM
From the government's perspective, the events of American Pelagic
represented "the perfect storm" of bad facts. The plaintiff, owner of a
large fishing vessel, could show that the government-as-facilitator had
enticed it to invest substantial amounts of money in fishing equipment.31
In a variety of publications, the government had touted the fact that
stocks of Atlantic herring and mackerel were healthy, indeed
underexploited, and that there was significant demand for these species in
foreign markets. Furthermore, the plaintiff could show that its
investments were subjectively reasonable: its principals had carefully
researched both world fish markets and the regulatory environment of
the two fisheries prior to investing.
After spending significant sums of money outfitting a vessel, the
Atlantic Star, specifically for use in those fisheries, the plaintiff obtained
all of the federal permits it needed to begin fishing.32 Soon thereafter,
other herring and mackerel fishermen began to object to the plaintiff's
entry into the fisheries.33 While its potential competitors' objections were
thinly veiled with conservation concerns, they were obviously based on
conservation, to facilitate long-term protection of essential fish habitats, and to realize the full
potential of the Nation's fishery resources." Id. § 1801(a)(6).
31. See infra Part I.A.2.
32. See infra Part I.A.2.
33. See infra Part I.A.2.
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fears that they would have difficulty competing with the larger, faster,
and technologically superior A tantic Star.
In response to the fishermen's complaints, Congress passed
legislation that prohibited the Atlantic Star, and only the Atlantic Star,
from participating in the herring and mackerel fisheries.34 As a result of
this legislation, the Atlantic Star- which had been purpose-built for these
fisheries-had no, or little, other viable economic use.35
A. The Facts
1. Regulation and Facilitation in the Herring and Mackerel Fisheries
Federal management of the Atlantic mackerel36 fishery began in
April of 1983, when the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS)
approved the Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management Council's Fishery
Management Plan (FMP) for the species. 37 According to the Council, the
goals of the plan were to:
34. See infra Part I.A.3.
35. See infra Part I.A.3.
36. Mid-AtI. Fishery Mgmt. Council, Squid, Mackerel, Butterfish Fishery Management
Plan, Executive Summary, http://www.mafmc.org/mid-atlanti6/fmp/smb-a8.htm (last visited Apr.
5, 2007).
Atlantic mackerel, Scomber scombrus, is a fast swimming, pelagic, schooling species
distributed in the Northwest Atlantic between Labrador and North Carolina. There
are two major spawning components of this population: a southern group that spawns
primarily in the Mid-Atlantic Bight during April and May, and a northern group that
spawns in the Gulf of St. Lawrence in June and July. Both groups winter between
Sable Island (off Nova Scotia) and Cape Hatteras in waters generally warmer than
7*C (45°F), with extensive northerly (spring) and southerly (autumn) migrations to
and from spawning and summering grounds. The two groups are managed as a unit
stock. Maximum observed size in recent years is about 47 cm (18.5 in) in length and
1.3 kg (3 lb) in weight. Sexual maturity begins at age 2 and is usually complete by age
3. Maximum age is about 20 years.
William Overholtz, Atlantic Mackerel, http://www.nefsc.noaa.gov/sos/spsyn/pp/mackerel (last
visited Mar. 24, 2007). For more information on the life history of Atlantic mackerel, see
Essential Fish Habitat Source Document: Atlantic Mackerel, Scomber scombrus, Life History
and Habitat Characteristics, NOAA Technical Memorandum NMFS-NE-141 (1999),
http://www.nefsc.noaa.gov/nefsc/ publications/tm/tml4l/tml4l.pdf.
37. Through the Magnuson-Stevens Act, Congress created a system of eight Regional
Fishery Management Councils, each of which manages fisheries within a sizeable fraction of
federal waters. 16 U.S.C. § 1852(a) (2006). The size of the area managed by each council varies.
The Western Pacific Fishery Management Council has the largest spatial jurisdiction, covering
nearly 1.5 million square miles, while the North Pacific Council manages an area of about
900,000 square miles. North Pacific Fishery Management Council, http://www.fakr.noaa.gov/
npfmc (last visited Mar. 24, 2007); Western Pacific Fishery Managment Council,
http://www.wpcouncil.org (last visited Mar. 24, 2007). Some of the councils manage only a few
hundred thousand square miles. See, e.g., New England Fishery Management Council,
http://www.nefmc.org (last visited Mar. 24, 2007). Generally speaking, council management
covers areas within three and 200 miles from the shores of the United States. Under the
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1. Enhance the probability of successful (i.e., the historical average)
recruitment to the fisheries;
2. Promote growth of the U.S. commercial fishery, including the
fishery for export;
3. Provide the greatest degree of freedom and flexibility to all
harvesters of these resources consistent with the attainment of
the other objectives of this FMP;
4. Provide marine recreational fishing opportunities, recognizing the
contribution of recreational fishing to the national economy;
5. Increase understanding of the conditions of the stocks and
fisheries;
6. Minimize harvesting conflicts among U.S. commercial, U.S.
recreational, and foreign fishermen.38
Pursuant to the rules in the FMP, fishermen interested in catching
Atlantic mackerel had to first obtain a permit from the NMIFS. 39
Government regulation of the herring fishery began in 1978, when
the NMFS approved the New England Fishery Management Council's
FMP for herring.4" The NMFS rescinded this FMP in 1982. 4" After 1982,
Submerged Lands Act, Congress has given coastal states primary responsibility for managing
fisheries between zero and three miles offshore.
Pursuant to Magnuson-Stevens Act, each council is responsible for writing a fishery
management plan (FMP) for each fishery within its jurisdiction that is in need of "conservation
and management." 16 U.S.C. § 1852(h)(1)(A). FMPs must establish "management measures...
necessary and appropriate . . . to prevent overfishing and rebuild overfished stocks, and to
protect, restore, and promote the long-term health and stability of the fishery." Id. § 1853(a)(1).
The National Marine Fisheries Service, a federal agency within the Department of
Commerce and its National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, is responsible for
ensuring that each FMP is consistent with plan requirements set out in the Magnuson-Stevens
Act, including ten "national standards for fishery conservation and management." Id. §
1851(a)(1)-(10). Through the National Standards, Congress has provided the councils with
loosely worded guidance on issues of conservation, efficiency, ecosystem concerns, and
fishermen's safety. Id. § 1851(a).
Currently, the councils manage nearly 700 distinct populations, or stocks, of fish under
forty-five Fishery Management Plans. STATUS OF THE U.S. FISHERIES FOR 2004, supra note 28.
38. Mid-Atl. Fishery Mgmt. Council, Squid, Mackerel, Butterfish Fishery Management
Plan, supra note 36.
39. Am. Pelagic Fishing Co. v. United States (American Pelagic II), 379 F.3d 1363 (Fed.
Cir. 2004).
40. NEW ENGLAND FISHERY MGMT. COUNCIL, FINAL ATLANTIC HERRING FISHERY
MANAGEMENT PLAN 1 (1999), available athttp://www.nefmc.org/herring/index.html.
The Atlantic herring, Clupea harengus, is widely distributed in continental shelf
waters from Labrador to Cape Hatteras. Important commercial fisheries for juvenile
herring (ages 1 to 3) have existed since the last century along the coasts of Maine and
New Brunswick. Development of large-scale fisheries for adult herring is
comparatively recent, primarily occurring in the western Gulf of Maine, on Georges
Bank, and on the Scotian Shelf. Gulf of Maine herring migrate from summer feeding
grounds along the Maine coast to southern New England and Mid-Atlantic areas
during winter, with larger individuals tending to migrate further distances. Tagging
experiments have also provided evidence of intermixing of Gulf of Maine-Scotian
Shelf herring during different phases of the annual migration.
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herring fishing in federal waters was not directly covered by an FMP.42
However, the New England Council and the NMFS indirectly regulated
herring fishing off New England by virtue of the fact that fishing for
herring had the potential to result in the incidental bycatch of other,
FMP-covered species.43 Thus, any person interested in fishing for herring
in federal waters had to obtain a Northeast Multispecies Permit before
doing so.44 In addition, if the fisherman intended to use midwater trawl
gear45 in federal waters, she was required to first obtain an "authorization
letter" from the NMFS 46
Throughout the 1990s, the government encouraged fishermen to
invest in both the mackerel and herring fisheries. After assessing the
condition of the stocks in the early 1990s, a government report concluded
that "mackerel and herring stocks in the Atlantic Ocean were at record
highs and were substantially underfished. ' '47 For 1997, the Mid-Atlantic
Council set the allowable biological catch (ABC) for Atlantic mackerel at
Overholtz, Atlantic Herring, supra note 36. For more information on the life history of Atlantic
herring, see Essential Fish Habitat Source Document: Atlantic Herring, Clupea harengus, Life
History and Habitat Characteristics, NOAA Technical Memorandum NMFS-NE-192 (2d ed.
2005), available at http://www.nefsc.noaa.gov/nefsc/publications/tm/tm192/tm192.pdf.
41. Atlantic Herring Fishery Management Plan, http://www.nefmc.orglherring/summary/
herring.pdf (last visited Mar. 24, 2007). The Magnuson-Stevens Act requires councils to write
FMPs only for those fisheries that are in need of conservation and management. 16 U.S.C. §
1852(h) (2006).
42. ATL. STATES MARINE FISHERIES COMM'N ATL. HERRING PLAN DEV. TEAM, FISHERY
MANAGEMENT REPORT No. 33 OF THE ATLANTIC STATES MARINE FISHERIES COMMISSION,
AMENDMENT 1 TO THE INTERSTATE FISHERY MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR ATLANTIC SEA
HERRING 36 (1999), available at http://www.asmfc.org/speciesDocuments/herring/fmps/
herringAmendl.pdf.
43. See American Pelagic II1, 379 F.3d at 1368.
44. Id.
45.
A midwater trawl consists of a cone shaped body, normally made of four panels,
ending in a codend with lateral wings extending forward from the opening. It is usually
much larger than a bottom trawl and designed and rigged to fish in midwater,
including in the surface water. The front parts are sometimes made with very large
meshes or ropes, which herd the targeted fish inwards so that they can be overtaken
by smaller meshes in the aft trawl sections. The horizontal opening is maintained
either by otter boards or by towing the net by two boats (pair trawling). Floats on the
headline and weights on the groundline often maintain the vertical opening. Modern
large midwater trawls, however, are rigged in such a way that floats are not required,
relying on downward forces from weights to keep the vertical opening during fishing.
Food & Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Gear Type Fact Sheet, Midwater
Trawls, http://www.fao.org/figis/servlet/geartype?fid=207 (last visited Mar. 24, 2007).
46. Am. Pelagic Fishing Co. v. United States (American Pelagic II), 379 F.3d 1363, 1368
(Fed. Cir. 2004).
47. Id. at 1366. In response to these findings, the NMFS in 1994 rescinded the "control
date" of the mackerel fishery, giving notice that all fishermen who thereafter began fishing for
Atlantic mackerel would be eligible for a mackerel permit if the government later decided to
limit the number of permitted vessels in the fishery. See id. at 1367 & n.3. After the NMFS
announces a "control date" for a fishery, it issues no more permits for that fishery. Id.
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1.178 million metric tons; 8 commercial landings for that year totaled only
15,406 metric tons.49 That same year, the New England Council proposed
to set the ABC for herring at 300,000 metric tons. Commercial landings
of herring in 1997 totaled only 95,715 metric tons. 1
While government agencies were publicizing the facts that herring
and mackerel stocks were high and that catches were low, they were also
advertising the financial opportunities available to fishermen willing to
invest in better equipment. For example, a 1993 study commissioned by
the U.S. Senate Finance Committee and prepared by the U.S.
International Trade Commission had concluded that participation in the
Atlantic mackerel fishery by larger, more efficient fishing vessels was
necessary if the United States was to compete successfully in European
mackerel markets. 2 In 1996, the Mid-Atlantic Council published a report
indicating that
[t]he key problem for the U.S. [mackerel] fishery remains that of
Atlantic mackerel not being a desirable fish in the eyes of most
American consumers, and transportation costs have been prohibitive
in shipping this low-value, bulk product to foreign markets where it
enjoys greater acceptance. In order to compete in the world bulk
market, the U.S. will have to emulate its foreign competitors, which
harvest, process and ship mackerel in large quantities so as to take
advantage of economies of scale. Currently, the U.S. east coast
industry does not have the large vessels necessary to participate in
this market ... "
2. The Entrepreneur Enters the Fishery
Lisa Torgersen was an experienced fisherman who, by 1996, had
worked in the fishing industry for seven years as a crew member, the
manager of a factory trawler, and as operations manager for a company
that owned one large trawler and managed two others. 4 In early 1996,
48. The term "Allowable Biological Catch," or ABC, refers to the council's determination
of a safe level of catch for the species. It is not the same as "Total Allowable Catch," or TAC,
which refers to a limit set by a council on the total amount of fish that can be caught that year.
Eagle & Thompson, supra note 20, at 655-56.
49. American Pelagic I1I, 379 F.3d at 1367.
50. Id. As noted, the New England Council did not have an FMP in place for herring
during the relevant time period. However, it was in the process of drafting an FMP, which the
NMFS ultimately approved in 1999. Id.
51. ld
52. Id.
53. Am. Pelagic Fishing Co. v. United States (American Pelagic 1), 49 Fed. Cl. 36, 39
(2001), revd and remanded, 379 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (quoting MID-ATL. FISHERIES
MGMT. COUNCIL, ANNUAL QUOTA SPECIFICATIONS FOR ATLANTIC MACKEREL, LOLIGO,
ILLEX, AND BUTrERFISH FOR 1997, 12 (1996)).
54. Am. Pelagic Fishing Co. v. United States (American Pelagic 11), 55 Fed. Cl. 575, 577
(2003), rev'd and remanded, 379 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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she decided to investigate the possibility of purchasing a vessel of her
own.55 In the course of her research, she discovered the aforementioned
government stock assessment reports indicating that Atlantic mackerel
and herring stocks were plentiful.56 She also read the 1993 International
Trade Commission report highlighting the market opportunities that
could be exploited through the use of larger, more efficient vessels in
these fisheries. 7 In order to confirm the marketability of the fish, Ms.
Torgersen sent samples of Atlantic mackerel to several Japanese seafood
wholesalers whom she knew from prior business dealings. 8 In response,
these buyers sent Ms. Torgersen "enthusiastic letter[s] expressing their
desire to purchase large quantities of Atlantic herring and mackerel."59
Based on this information, Ms. Torgersen formed the Atlantic Star
Fishing Company for the purpose of purchasing and refitting a vessel for
use in the Atlantic mackerel and herring fisheries.6" In late 1996, Ms.
Torgersen's company joined several other partners in forming the
American Pelagic Fishing Company (the "Company").6 1 In November of
1996, the Company purchased a used, 369-foot-long vessel known as the
Apollo Ifor $1.7 million.62
When the Company purchased the Apollo II, it was an incinerator
ship.63 The Company contracted with a Norwegian shipyard to have it
specially outfitted: "purpose built" for catching mackerel and herring.' 4 In
addition to its fishing gear, the Atlantic Star, as it would be renamed, was
to be equipped with state-of-the-art freezing, pumping, and sorting
facilities,6 5 enabling it to process and store up to 500 metric tons of fish.66
55. Id.
56. Id. at 578.
57. Id.




62. Id. at 580.
63. Id. Incinerator ships burn waste at sea, where the emissions are less likely to cause
direct harm to human populations. Cf Phillip Shabecoff, E.P.A. Relationship to Waste Disposer
Creates Controversy, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 1985, at Al.
64. Am. Pelagic Fishing Co. v. United States (American Pelagic I1), 55 Fed. Cl. 575, 580
(2003), rev'd and remanded, 379 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Am. Pelagic Fishing Co. v. United
States (American Pelagic Il), 379 F.3d at 1367.
65.
The sorting machine, consisting of a system of rollers, would separate the fish into
different sizes and send them into bins filled with chilled water. After the fish were
sorted according to size, they were pumped through a tube and into plate freezers.
Once inside the freezers, the fish were frozen into solid blocks. The frozen blocks then
traveled along a conveyor belt to machines which placed the blocks in cartons and
strapped the cartons shut. Workers would then stack the cartons on wooden pallets.
American Pelagic II, 55 Fed. Cl. at 581.
66. American Pelagic III, 379 F.3d at 1368.
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The vessel would have two large deck cranes, permitting it to offload 90
percent of its fish to transport ships at sea in fair or foul weather.67 The
Atlantic Star, and its sophisticated equipment, would be powered by two
6,700 horsepower engines. 68
All of these features would give the Atlantic Star significant
advantages in the race-for-the-fish management regimes governing
Atlantic mackerel and herring fishing.69 The ship's high-powered engines
and advanced fishing gear would allow it to get to the fish quickly and
catch them rapidly.7" Perhaps most importantly, its freezers, storage
capacity, and ability to offload at sea would save it valuable time by
minimizing the number of trips back and forth from fishing grounds to
port.7" While its competitors were hauling fish back to the dock, the
Adantic Starwould be catching and selling fish.
By the time all of this work had been completed, the Company had
invested approximately $34 million in the Atlantic Star." In 1997, while
the boat was being completed, the Company applied for, and received
from the NMFS, all of the federal fisheries permits it needed to fish for
mackerel and herring.73
3. Congress Responds to Competitors' Complaints
Before the Atlantic Star began fishing, other mackerel and herring
fishermen-all of whom used much smaller fishing vessels-voiced
concern about the effect this large, technologically superior boat would
have on the fishery.74 The Atlantic Star was 369 feet long; no other vessel
operating in the fishery at that time was over 165 feet long or had engines
larger than 3,000 horsepower. Although the fishermen's concerns were
ostensibly about the potentially detrimental effects on conservation of the
67. American Pelagic , 55 Fed. Cl. at 581.
68. Am. Pelagic Fishing Co. v. United States (American Pelagic 1), 49 Fed. Cl. 36, 38
(2001), rev'd and remanded, American Pelagic II 379 F.3d 1363.
69. A race-for-fish management regime is one in which the government sets annual limits
on total catch. Once the government opens the fishing season, the fishermen attempt to catch the
fish as quickly as possible, because as soon as the total catch limit is reached, the government
closes the fishery. Parzival Copes, A Critical Review of the Individual Ouota as a Device in
Fisheries Management, 62 LAND ECON. 278, 279 (1986).
70. Am. Pelagic Fishing Co. v. United States (American Pelagic 1), 55 Fed. Cl. 575, 580
(2003), rev'd and remanded, 379 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
71. Id. at 581.
72. Id. at 582.
73. In order to participate in these two fisheries, the plaintiff needed two permits, one for
mackerel and one for unintentionally bycaught groundfish. It also needed an authorization letter
from the NMFS, permitting the Atlantic Star to carry small-mesh midwater trawl nets. American
Pelagic II, 379 F.3d at 1368.
74. Am. Pelagic Fishing Co. v. United States (American Pelagic 1), 49 Fed. Cl. 36, 40
(2001), rev'd andremanded, American Pelagic III, 379 F.3d 1363.
75. Id. at 41.
2007]
ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY
stocks, it is not difficult to imagine that they were equally or more
concerned about their ability to compete in the race for fish with the
A tan tic Star
At a joint meeting of the Atlantic Herring Section and the NEFMC
Herring Committee in March 1997, potential restrictions on vessel
specifications were discussed. The concern about the Atlantic Star
was obvious. One attendee at the joint meeting stated, "There's a
U.S. boat in Norway that will have a 300 ton daily capacity. There's
room for growth in the herring and mackerel fishery but not this
much growth and not at this pace without severely impacting the
current herring and mackerel fishery. We need to keep this fishery
local.,
76
Ultimately, the would-be competitors of the Atlantic Star succeeded
in convincing their representatives in Congress to introduce legislation
that would ban "any fishing vessel, in the Atlantic mackerel and herring
industries, equal to or greater than 165 feet in length, with an engine of
more than 3,000 horsepower. '77 At a hearing on the proposed ban,
Michael Love, general manager of the Atlantic Star, testified that he
believed his vessel was the only one that would be affected by the
legislation.78
This bill, and a similar bill introduced in the Senate,79 ultimately
failed. However, in 1997, the ban passed as a rider to an appropriations
measure.' The ban was renewed in 1998 and made permanent in 1999.81
76. Id. at 40.
77. American Pelagic III, 379 F.3d at 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citing H.R. 1855, 105th Cong.
(1997)).
78. American Pelagic 1, 49 Fed. Cl. at 41 (citing Fish and Wild Life Issues.- Hearing on H.R.
1855 Before the House Subcomm. on Fisheries Conservation, Wildlife and Oceans, 105th Cong.
(1997)).
79. S. 1192, 105th Cong. (1997).
80. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 616, 111 Stat. 2440, 2518-19 (1997).
81. Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-31, § 3025, 113
Stat. 57, 100-01 (1999); Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and
Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 202, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681
(1998); Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 616, 111 Stat. 2440, 2518-19 (1998).
Specifically, these Acts provided that:
(a) None of the funds made available in this Act may be used to issue or renew a
fishing permit or authorization for any fishing vessel of the United States greater
than 165 feet in registered length or of more than 750 gross registered tons, and
that has an engine or engines capable of producing a total of more than 3,000 shaft
horsepower-
(1) as specified in the permit application required under part 648.4(a)(5) of title
50, Code of Federal Regulations, and the authorization required under part
648.80(d)(2) of title 50, Code of Federal Regulations, to engage in fishing for
Atlantic mackerel or herring (or both) under the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery
Conservation and Management Act (16 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.); or
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These riders required the NMFS to revoke plaintiff's permits and
authorization letter. Unable to participate in the mackerel and herring
fisheries, the plaintiff sent the Atlantic Star around the world in search of
a profitable use.82 None was found, and plaintiff was ultimately forced to
sell the vessel.83
B. The Regulatory Takings Claim
In its 1999 complaint to the Court of Federal Claims, the American
Pelagic Fishing Company alleged temporary regulatory takings of both its
fishing permits and the Atlantic Star.' The plaintiff sought compensation
equal to "'the expected net revenues or profit from the operation of the
[Atlantic Star] in the fisheries of the United States' during the fiscal years
1998 and 1999."" 5
1. Property Interest
In order to prove that a regulatory taking has occurred, a plaintiff
must first establish that the contested regulation has impinged upon a
compensable private property right.86 One way to frame the inquiry into
(2) that would allow such a vessel to engage in the catching, taking, or harvesting
of fish in any other fishery within the exclusive economic zone of the United
States (except territories), unless a certificate of documentation has been
issued for the vessel and endorsed with a fishery endorsement that was
effective on September 25, 1997 and such fishery endorsement was not
surrendered at any time thereafter.
(b) Any fishing permit or authorization issued or renewed prior to the date of the
enactment of this Act for a fishing vessel to which the prohibition in subsection
(a)(1) applies that would allow such vessel to engage in fishing for Atlantic
mackerel or herring (or both) during fiscal year 1998 shall be null and void, and
none of the funds made available in this Act may be used to issue a fishing permit
or authorization that would allow a vessel whose permit or authorization was
made null and void pursuant to this subsection to engage in the catching, taking,
or harvesting of fish in any other fishery within the exclusive economic zone of the
United States.
82. Am. Pelagic Fishing Co. v. United States (American Pelagic II), 55 Fed. Cl. 575, 582-84
(2003), rev'd and remanded, 379 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
83. American Pelagic III, 379 F.3d at 1369.
84. Id.
85. Id. (quoting Am. Pelagic Fishing Co. v. United States (American Pelagic 1), 49 Fed. Cl.
36, 67 (2001)).
86. Maritrans, Inc. v. United States, 342 F.3d 1344, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Wyatt v. United
States, 271 F.3d 1090, 1096 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ("It is axiomatic that only persons with a valid
property interest at the time of the taking are entitled to compensation."). According to Brian
Gray,
The Supreme Court has made clear in several important decisions that the plaintiff in
a takings case must establish that he or she possesses property rights vis-a-vis the
government, which the government has taken either by eminent domain or by
ECOLOGY LA W QUARTERLY
whether the plaintiff has lost a potentially compensable property right is
to ask whether the plaintiff ever had the right to use her property in a
way that the regulation now prohibits. If the answer to this question is
"no," then there is no need to proceed further: the government has not
taken any property. The Supreme Court in Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council directed courts to look to "background principles of the
State's law of property and nuisance"' in order to determine whether
particular rights do or do not inhere in title to the property. In Lucas,
Justice Scalia explained how nuisance law operates as a limit on title:
[T]he owner of a lakebed, for example, would not be entitled to
compensation when he is denied the requisite permit to engage in a
landfilling operation that would have the effect of flooding others'
land.... Such regulatory action may well have the effect of eliminating
the land's only economically productive use, but it does not proscribe
a productive use that was previously permissible under relevant
property and nuisance principles. The use of these properties for what
are now expressly prohibited purposes was always unlawful....'
In addition to nuisance law, a range of "property principles" might
limit a property owner's "permissible" rights.89 Particularly relevant to
American Pelagic is the government's trustee responsibility for wildlife.'
Citing New York and California state court decisions, Blumm and Ritchie
argue that "[t]hese courts' observations that state wildlife protection can
be a background principle of property law appear to be a reasonable
application of Lucas.'' In other words, a plaintiff might have no inherent
right to use her property in a way that harms wildlife that the government
owns or holds in trust for the public. Thus, government regulation
regulation. If the plaintiff cannot prove such a property right, the takings claim fails ab
initio."
Brian E. Gray, The Property Right in Water, 9 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENvTL. L. & POL'Y 1, 2
(2002).
87. 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992).
88. Id. at 1029-31; accord Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470
(1987); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
89. In a recent article, Michael Blumm and Lucus Ritchie document court decisions finding
title limitations in the public trust doctrine, the natural use doctrine, the federal navigational
servitude, the doctrine of custom, water law, the wildlife trust, and Indian treaty rights. Michael
C. Blumm & Lucus Ritchie, Lucas's Unlikely Legacy- The Rise Of Background Principles as
Categorical Takings Defenses, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 321 (2005).
90. The concept of a government wildlife trust in the United States has its root in English
law, and was developed by state courts throughout the nineteenth century. Michael C. Blumm &
Lucus Ritchie, The Pioneer Spirit and the Public Trust: The American Rules of Capture and
State Ownership of Wildlife, 35 ENVTL. L. 673, 693-701 (2005).
91. Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 89, at 353; see also MICHAEL J. BEAN & MELANIE J.
ROWLAND, THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW 38 (1997); John D. Echeverria &
Julie Lurman, "Perfectly Astounding" Public Rights.- Wildlife Protection and the Takings
Clause, 16 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 331, 356-64 (2003).
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limiting direct or indirect killing of wildlife would not interfere with any
private rights and could not give rise to a takings claim.
2. Has the Regulation Gone Too Far?
If the plaintiff can establish that regulation has affected its property
rights, then the court must consider whether or not a taking has occurred.
The overarching question in the inquiry, as stated in Pennsylvania Coal
Co. v. Mahon, is whether the government regulation has gone "too far" in
interfering with the property right.92 Since Pennsylvania Coal, courts have
attempted to answer the question of "how far is too far?" in individual
cases by applying a set of categorical rules and, where those rules are
inapposite, a multi-pronged balancing test.93
The first "categorical rule" comes into play where the regulation
permits "permanent physical occupation" of plaintiff's property. 94 The
second is applied when the contested regulation has deprived the plaintiff
of all viable economic use of the property: "when the owner of real
property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses
in the name of the common good, that is, to leave his property
economically idle, he has suffered a taking."95
If neither of these categorical rules apply, courts resolve the takings
issue by application of a case-by-case balancing test.96 The Supreme Court
fully articulated the case-by-case approach in Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. New York City, in which the Court considered
whether a New York City program prohibiting development of historical
landmarks constituted a taking.97 In assessing the plaintiff's claim in that
case, the Court weighed "the regulation's economic effect on the
landowner, the extent to which the regulation interferes with reasonable
investment-backed expectations, and the character of the government
action."98 However, as the Court clarified in a later case, no one of these
factors is dispositive: "Penn Central does not supply mathematically
precise variables, but instead provides important guideposts that lead to
the ultimate determination whether just compensation is required." 99
The economic effect on the landowner is measured in terms of the
"diminution in property value" due to the government regulation."°
Overlapping with this measurement, and perhaps also with the
92. Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
93. See, e.g., Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617 (2001).
94. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 427 (1982).
95. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992).
96. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
97. Id. at 107.
98. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 617.
99. Id. at 634.
100. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 131.
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preliminary inquiry into the property owner's inherent rights, l° the
second prong of Penn Central focuses on the extent to which the
regulation has interfered with the plaintiff's investment-backed
expectations." 2 The court will consider what the landowner expected
when he acquired title, and what investments he made in reliance on
those expectations; reliance on reasonable expectations makes a stronger
case for compensation.1 3  Courts have interpreted Penn Centrals
"character of government action" prong in a variety of ways-at least
nine. 3" As will be seen shortly, the Court of Federal Claims in American
Pelagic, harking back to Pennsylvania Coal°5 and Armstrong v. United
States,"6 interpreted "character of government action" in terms of the
relative distribution of costs and benefits among the public.0 7 Under this
view, the fewer property owners to which a regulation applies, the more
likely it is that a taking has occurred.0 8
The effect of a regulation does not have to be permanent for there to
be a taking. In First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v.
County of Los Angeles,0 9 the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff would
be entitled to compensation for the period between the effective date of
the regulation and the date the regulation was rescinded, but only if
application of the regulation were found to be a taking.1'0 In Tahoe-Sierra
Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, the Court
held that some temporary land use restrictions, although not the
particular restriction in that case, might give rise to compensable takings
claims."'
101. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606,634 (2001) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
102. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124-25 (1978) (citations
omitted).
103. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 633 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
104. John D. Echeverria, The "Character" Factor in Regulatory Takings Analysis, SK081
A.L.I.-A.B.A. 143, 146 (2005); see also Steven J. Eagle, "Character" as "Worthiness" A New
Meaning for Penn Central's Third Test, 27 ZONING & PLANNING RPT., June 2004, at 1
(discussing a possible new role for the character of the government action test).
105. 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) ("average reciprocity of advantage.., has been recognized as
a justification of various laws").
106. 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (noting that the Fifth Amendment "was designed to bar
Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and
justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.").
107. Am. Pelagic Fishing Co. v. United States (American Pelagic 1), 49 Fed. Cl. 36, 51
(2001), rev'd and remanded, 379 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
108. See, e.g., Steven J. Eagle, supra note 104, at 5 (citing and quoting E. Enterprises v.
Apfel, 524 U.S. 498,537 (1998)).
109. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
110. Id. at 318-19.
111. 535 U.S. 302, 342 (2002).
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3. Takings Analysis in American Pelagic
a. Court ofFederal Claims
In 2002, the Court of Federal Claims granted the plaintiff's motion
for summary judgment, and awarded it $37,275,952.67 in compensation
for a temporary, twenty-month regulatory taking of the Atlantic Star.'1
The trial court found that while the permits themselves did not constitute
property for the purposes of a Fifth Amendment takings claim, the
Atlantic Star did."3 The trial court also found that the plaintiff satisfied
each of the Penn Central factors. As to diminution in value, the court
found that
The economic impact on plaintiff of the appropriations riders was
severe. Plaintiff spent nearly $40 million on the Atlantic Star
specifically to equip it to participate in the Atlantic mackerel and
herring fisheries. With the enactment of the riders, this investment
was wiped out. The Atlantic Star could not profitably operate without
the permits that were revoked and denied by Congress; the
appropriations riders prohibited all profitable uses of the vessel.1' 4
The court found that the plaintiff's investment-backed expectation that it
would be allowed to participate in the fishery was reasonable:
Indeed, the government, through the NMFS and the [International
Trade Commission], induced plaintiff to make its investment in the
Atlantic Star. The government cannot now argue that reliance by
plaintiff on the government's own statements was unreasonable.
Plaintiff could not assume that the regulatory regime would remain
static, but it had no reason to anticipate that Congress would render
the regulatory regime uniquely unavailable to it. Plaintiff could not
have anticipated that Congress would single it out to revoke its
permits by legislation." 5
The court devoted a great deal of attention to the "character of the
government action" prong of Penn Central analysis. It was undisputed
that Congress' ban applied only to the Atlantic Star. This "singling out"
was very troubling to the court:
All of the legislation in question here was clearly targeted at the
Atlantic Star, as the predecessor bills to the appropriations riders
indicate. As previously stated, Senator Snowe, when introducing S.
1192, referred to a "369 foot factory trawler" that was about to enter
112. Am. Pelagic Fishing Co. v. United States (American Pelagic Il), 379 F.3d 1363, 1366
(Fed. Cir. 2004).
113. Am. Pelagic Fishing Co. v. United States (American Pelagic 1), 49 Fed. Cl. 36, 46
(2001), rev'd and remanded, American Pelagic III, 379 F.3d 1363.
114. Id. at 50.
115. Id. at 49.
2007]
ECOLOGY LA W QUARTERLY
the Atlantic mackerel and herring fisheries; she was surely referring
to the Atlantic Star. Furthermore, Congress was informed, during
hearings regarding H.R. 1855, that the size prohibitions under
consideration would affect only the Atlantic Star and no other vessels.
Congressman Jack Metcalf of Washington also pointed out this fact:
[APFC's] vessel, the Atlantic Star, is the only vessel that will be
legislated out of existence-and into bankruptcy-by enactment
of H.R. 1855. Such a result is not only bad fishery policy, it is bad
Government policy and is manifestly unfair. We here in Congress
should be trying to prevent Government takings of private
property, not facilitating them, as this legislation most certainly
does.
The character of the governmental action here, because that action, in
both purpose and effect, was retroactive and targeted at plaintiff,
supports the finding of a taking.'
1 6
Applying the Penn Central test, and leaning heavily on its third
prong, the Court of Federal Claims found that the appropriations rider
had affected a temporary taking of the Atlantic Star.
b. Federal Circuit
The government appealed this decision. On appeal, the government
not only contested the trial court's findings with respect to the Penn
Central factors, but attacked the trial court's finding that property was
involved at all, arguing that "no property interest exists in an individual's
investment in uses of personalty that are dependent upon discretionary
permit issuances by the government.1 . 7 In other words, while the
Atlantic Starwas property, that part of its value that had been "taken" by
the rider existed solely as a function of the permit; and since the permit
was freely revocable, so too was this differential value. As the court of
appeals framed the question: "Was the right to fish for Atlantic mackerel
and herring in the EEZ a legally cognizable property interest such that it
was a stick in the bundle of property rights that American Pelagic
acquired as the owner of the Atlantic Sta.Q" 8 The court of appeals
agreed with the government and held that there was no such stick in
plaintiff's bundle of rights. 9 In other words, the government owned the
right to fish in the EEZ; when granted fishing permits, fishermen have a
license to catch fish, and nothing more.
116. Id. at 51 (citations omitted) (modification in original).
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11. GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP IN THEORY AND IN PRACTICE
The decision in American Pelagic is consistent both with the
language of the Magnuson-Stevens Act and with the concept of the
government wildlife trust discussed by authors such as Blumm and
Ritchie, 2 ' and Echeverria and Lurman. 12 ' The Federal Circuit correctly
recognized that if the government owns natural resources it is impossible
for an individual to own them-or rights to -,apture them-at the same
time:
Because it was already in place by the time American Pelagic
purchased the Atlantic Star, the Magnuson Act was an "existing rule"
or "background principle[]" of federal law that inhered in American
Pelagic's title to the vessel. In the words of the Supreme Court, as far
as ownership of the Atlantic Star was concerned, the sovereign rights
of the United States in the EEZ "inhered in the title itself, in the
restrictions that background principles of the [federal government's]
law.., already placed upon.., ownership."... As of 1996, when the
Atlantic Star was purchased, the Magnuson Act and the attendant
regulatory scheme precluded any permitted fisherman from
possessing a property right in his vessel to fish in the EEZ. 22
The legal construct of government ownership of fishing rights is
supported by economic theory predicting that putting resources under the
control of a sole owner will eliminate waste-causing externalities.'23 This
section of the Article examines that rationale and why the Magnuson-
Stevens Act appears not to be achieving the promised benefits of sole
ownership.
A. Inefficiencies in the Race for Fish: Tragedy of the Commons
In two seminal articles, Scott Gordon and Garrett Hardin explained
the tragic results flowing from the exploitation of common property by
unallied individuals.124 The lack of controls or private property rights
means that each resource user has the opportunity and, more
importantly, the incentive to use resources as quickly as possible.2 5 In the
fishing context, this translates to what has commonly been called a "race
for fish."' 26
120. Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 89.
121. Echeverria & Lurman, supra note 91.
122. Am. Pelagic Fishing Co. v. United States (American Pelagic 111), 379 F.3d 1363, 1379
(Fed. Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).
123. See NEHER, supra note 18, at 256.
124. Gordon, supra note 18; Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE
1243 (1968).
125. Barton H. Thompson Jr., Tragically Difficult: The Obstacles to Governing the
Commons, 30 ENVTL. L. 241, 244-45 (2000).
126. Copes, supra note 69, at 279.
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The race for fish leads to two types of inefficiencies. First, users
deplete commons resources beyond their optimal stock level.'2 v In overly
simplified terms, traditional fisheries science posits that a properly
managed fishery is one where fishermen catch the "interest" from the
fishery account and not the "principal," and where the principal is
maintained at a level where the product of principal and interest rate is
highest.'28 This is the optimal stock level. Without assurances of future
access to the benefits of present forbearance, fishermen will not stop
fishing at this point, but will continue chasing fish until doing so is no
longer profitable.12 9 When the stock is below its optimal level, or
overfished, there is a loss to society that can be measured by the
difference between the maximum sustainable yield and the yield
produced by the overfished stock.
130
The second type of inefficiency is fishermen's overinvestment, or
overcapitalization, in fishing equipment.' The race for fish creates the
incentive to invest in faster boats and more effective fishing gear.' In a
properly managed fishery, these investments would be unnecessary;
fishermen could catch the same amount of fish, but with fewer and less
expensive boats. Alaska's salmon fisheries, managed by the state, provide
some concrete examples of overcapitalization. It has been estimated that
in the Bristol Bay sockeye fishery, for example, only a thousand boats
would be needed to catch the salmon currently caught by 1,878 permitted
boats. 3 3 The excess capacity in this fishery adds about $13 million
annually to the costs of catching those salmon. 134 These costs represent
127. Id. at 278-79.
128. This target level is known as "maximum sustainable yield." As noted above, it has been
incorporated into the Magnuson-Stevens Act as an objective (as the basis for what the law calls
"optimum" yield). 16 U.S.C. § 1802(33)(B) (2006). For a discussion of this, and less risky fishery
management targets, see Jonathan Roughgarden & Fraser Smith, Why Fisheries Collapse and
What to Do About It, 93 PROC. NAT'L. ACAD. 5078 (1996).
129. Fishermen will stop fishing at the point where all economic rent is dissipated. Gordon,
supra note 18, at 132. This point is known as "economic extinction." Simon Jennings et al., Life
History Correlates of Responses to Fisheries Exploitation, 265 PROC. ROYAL Soc. B 333, 333
(1998).
130. There is also a risk that the overfished stock will collapse, eliminating the resource's
ability to produce any economically viable yield.
131. John Ward, Capacity, Excess Capacity, and Fisheries Management, Proc. 2000 Int'l
Inst. on Fisheries Econ. & Trade, http://oregonstate.edu/dept/IIFET/2000/papers/ward.pdf (last
visited Apr. 6, 2007).
132. David J. Whitmarsh, The Fisheries Treadmill, 74 LAND ECON. 422 (1998).
133. BRISTOL BAY ECON. DEV. CORP., AN ANALYSIS OF OPTIONS TO RESTRUCTURE THE
BRISTOL BAY SALMON FISHERY (2003).
134. Id.
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deadweight losses to society; the funds spent on unnecessary vessels are
being put to an entirely unproductive use.135
B. The Sole Ownership Solution?
According to economic theory, sole ownership rationalizes resource
use by eliminating wasteful competition for the resource among
fishermen and by internalizing individually generated externalities.'36
Because she will take all costs into account, a sole owner has the
incentive to ensure that fish stocks are maintained at the level producing
an optimum yield and that no unnecessary resources are expended in
catching that yield.'37
Hardin and Gordon make no distinction between public and private
ownership in terms of their effectiveness at solving the tragedy of the
commons. 138 However, government is different from a private owner in an
important way: it is not a profit-oriented enterprise. Thus, it lacks the
financial incentive that would motivate a private owner to maximize long-
term profits. In place of this incentive, the legislature substitutes laws
meant to direct its fishery management agencies to mimic the behavior of
a private owner. 139 At the same time as it regulates, the government must
also encourage fishermen to invest in the fishery; as a not-for-profit
enterprise, the government is itself not interested in making such
investments.'n
This dual aspect of government ownership reduces the likelihood
that regulators will successfully emulate the decisions that would have
135. It is possible to argue that these funds are being used to put people, who might
otherwise be unemployed, to work. However, for reasons discussed below, overcapitalization
will ultimately jeopardize the sustainability of a fishery and, hence, its value as an employer.
136. See NEHER, supra note 18, at 256; see also Thriinn Eggertsson, The Economics of
Control, in RIGHTS To NATURE 157, 163 (Susan S. Hanna et al. eds., 1996).
137. Eggertsson, supra note 136. Some economists believe that private owners often do not
seek to maximize long-term profits:
Certainly, the government does not always get it perfectly right, but private and public
owners have very different planning horizons and very different objectives. As issue
are differences in "discounting" future benefits and the resulting implications for
resource policy. The presumption, and the reality, of public ownership is that in most
instances the future matters above all other considerations. For private owners, the
management of renewable natural resources is often the victim of a "faulty telescopic
faculty," wherein present needs often take precedence over future concerns.
SETH MACINKO & DANIEL W. BROMLEY, WHO OWNS AMERICA'S FISHERIES? 18-20 (2002).
138. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 18, at 135; Hardin, supra note 124.
139. See NEHER, supra note 18, at 256-57. Most natural resource management statutes
delegate significant power to agencies. See RASBAND ET AL., NATURAL RESOURCES LAW &
POLICY 205-20 (2004).
140. Governments have historically made significant indirect investments in fisheries
through a variety of subsidies. See. e.g., Hennessey & Healey, supra note 23; NAT'L MARINE
FISHERIES SERV., FEDERAL FISHERIES INVESTMENT TASK FORCE, REPORT TO CONGRESS
(1999).
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been made by a hypothetical private owner. First, regulators' need to
attract and retain private investment may conflict with the inevitable
necessity of restricting fishermen.14' For example, fish stocks fluctuate
naturally, 142 and when regulators reduce catches to prevent harm to the
stock, they may also force some fishermen out of business. 143 In order to
maintain investment in a fishery, regulators may choose to compromise
stock protection.'"
Second, fishermen who are uncertain about future government
restrictions have very different incentives from those of the "sole owner,"
the government. 4 Rational investors who operate in risky environments
will seek to buffer their risk through high returns that allow initial
investments to be quickly recaptured. 46 While, per American Pelagic,
fishermen cannot rely on the Fifth Amendment as insurance for their
investments, they are free to use other approaches, including lobbying
Congress and regulators. 147 If one accepts both that fishermen are
motivated to push for high catch levels and that Congress and agencies
will at times respond to this pressure, the logical conclusion is that the
ideal of sole ownership will not always be achieved when the government
is the owner.48
It is clear that the Magnuson-Stevens Act has not wholly succeeded
in eliminating the overfishing and overinvestment that plagued the pre-
regulation commons."' According to a 2004 government report, nearly 30
141. See Edward Ueber & Alex MacCall, The Rise and Fall of the California Sardine
Empire, in CLIMATE VARIABILITY, CLIMATE CHANGE & FISHERIES 45 (Michael H. Glantz ed.,
1992) ("Development-oriented government agencies may contribute to delayed and ineffective
management.").
142. See generally CLIMATE VARIABILITY, CLIMATE CHANGE & FISHERIES, supra note
141.
143. This will be true where fishermen have invested, or the government has allowed
fishermen to invest, to the degree that they are dependent on fishing the "high" phase of stock
fluctuations.
144. A compromise in protecting the stocks usually takes the form of a reduction in
probability that a given management measure will succeed. For example, managers might adopt
an annual catch quota that has an 18 percent chance of preventing overexploitation instead of
one that has a 51 percent chance of overexploitation. See Natural Res. Def. Council v. Daley,
209 F.3d 747 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Eagle & Thompson, supra note 20.
145. See Thompson, Tragically Difficult, supra note 125, at 242.
146. Gerry McNamara & Philip Bromiley, Risk and Return in Organizational Decision
Making, 42 ACAD. MGMT. J. 330, 332 (1999). Some investors, probably a minority, will not seek
returns equivalent to the risk. See, e.g., Roger Hartley et al., Who Really Wants to Be a
Millionaire? Estimates of Risk A version from Gameshow Data, Warwick Economics Research
Paper Series (2005), http://www.keele.ac.uk/depts/ec/Research/s-research/wwwtbam3lOlO5.pdf
(modeling estimates of risk aversion in a gameshow).
147. See, e.g., FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER & BETH L. LEECH, BASIC INTERESTS: THE
IMPORTANCE OF GROUPS IN POLITICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE 147-67 (1998).
148. That fishermen will lobby in this way is consistent with theories of rent seeking. See.
e.g., Rauf Azhar, Commons, Regulation, and Rent-Seeking Behavior: The Dilemma of
Pakistan's Guzara Forests, 42 ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE 115 (1993).
149. See Gordon, supra note 18.
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percent of fish stocks are below their optimal level. 5 This number
includes many of the nation's largest and most valuable fisheries. 1 ' The
data on overcapitalization are even worse. A 2001 government study
revealed that forty-one of seventy-five studied fisheries (55 percent),
again including many of the nation's largest and most valuable fisheries,
"exhibit[ed] signs of overcapacity. 152 Most major studies and reports on
implementation of fisheries regulation in the United States have
identified overcapitalization as a significant problem.153
These failures do not appear to be simply an artifact of pre-
regulation problems. Many of the fisheries that the government now
regulates were not being prosecuted by fishermen when the Magnuson-
Stevens Act was first passed.154 In other words, at least some of the
presently overfished and overcapitalized fisheries became this way
despite regulation.
Is it possible to prove that these problems have come about because
of fishermen's lobbying Congress and the councils for lax regulation? It is
true that even a private owner would have difficulty achieving a 100
percent success rate in fisheries management. Stock assessment, the
mathematical modeling of fish stocks used by fishery managers to identify
optimal catch levels, is fraught with uncertainty.'5 5 Models must take into
account a large number of parameters, including not only the life history
of the species and long-term climate trends, but also the dynamics of the
species' population as it is affected by populations of other species that
are equally difficult to assess.156 Private management would be prone to
the same kinds of scientific errors as public management.
150. STATUS OF THE U.S. FISHERIES FOR 2004, supra note 28, at 1.
151. See id A 1999 NOAA study indicated that U.S. landings were at that time about 30 to
40 percent less than could be produced by healthy fisheries. NAT'L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC
ADMIN., OUR LIVING OCEANS 8 (1999).
152. NAT'L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., supra note 28, at 12.
153. See, e.g., U.S. COMM'N ON OCEAN POLICY, AN OCEAN BLUEPRINT FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY: FINAL REPORT OF THE U.S. COMMISSION ON OCEAN POLICY 290-91 (2004),
available at http://www.oceancommission.gov/documents/fullcolor-rpt/000_ocean full_
report.pdf; PEW OCEANS COMM'N, AMERICA'S LIVING OCEANS: CHARTING A COURSE FOR
SEA CHANGE 40 (2003), available at http://www.pewtrusts.org/pdf/env-pew-oceans-final
report.pdf. In addition to the fact that overfished stocks and overcapitalization are inefficient,
they also stand as obstacles to achieving the ultimate objectives of regulation. Rebuilding a
fishery from an overfished condition necessitates reductions in current catch levels, oftentimes
drastic reductions. The marginal economic impacts of such reductions can be correlated to the
degree of overcapitalization of the fishery: catch reductions would have more severe impacts on
fishermen with thin, or no, profit margins than they would on fishermen operating at a profit.
154. See, e.g., Donald R. Gunderson, The great widow rockfish hunt of 1980-1982,4 N. AM.
J. FISHERIES MGMT. 465 (1984).
155. NAT'L ACAD. SCI., IMPROVING FISH STOCK ASSESSMENTS (1998).
156. Id.
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In an earlier paper, Thompson and Eagle tried to isolate the causes
of overfishing within fisheries management institutions.157 We concluded
that while it was difficult to assign blame exactly as among inaccurate
stock assessments, aggressive decision making by the councils, and
underenforcement of rules, it was clear that-in the fisheries examined-
the councils had been very aggressive in setting catch levels. For example,
in the Gulf of Mexico king mackerel fishery, the Gulf of Mexico Fishery
Management Council consistently set annual quotas at, over, or near the
high end of the range recommended by its scientific advisors.'58 These
tendencies can easily be explained as a product of industry lobbying.159
Two other pieces of evidence support the hypothesis that
government fishery managers are responding to incentives that are
different from those affecting a private owner. First, after making an
overutilization error, a private owner would not hesitate-as the
government has-to rebuild those stocks to optimal levels."6° Second, a
private owner would have every incentive not to overinvest in fishing
equipment, that is, to keep the costs of production to a minimum. The
failure to rebuild quickly, as well as the failure to regulate for
efficiency,'6 1 could be explained-like the aggressive decision making
described above -as direct products of industry lobbying.
162
157. Eagle & Thompson, supra note 20.
158. Id. at 657.
159. See ALAN CHRISTOPHER FINLAYSON, FISHING FOR TRUTH: A SOCIOLOGICAL
ANALYSIS OF NORTHERN COD STOCK ASSESSMENTS FROM 1977 TO 1990 (1994); Hennessey &
Healey, supra note 23; Thompson, Tragically Difficult, supra note 125; D.C. Wilson & P.
Degnbol, The Effects of Legal Mandates on Fisheries Science Deliberations, 58 FISHERIES RES.
1 (2002).
160. See Andrew A. Rosenberg et al., Rebuilding U.S. Fisheries: Progress and Problems, 4
FRONTIERS IN ECOLOGY & ENV'T 303 (2006); Carl Safina et al., U.S. Ocean Fish Recovery:
Staying the Course, 309 SCIENCE 707 (2005).
161. National Standard 5 requires consideration of efficiency "where practicable." One
interesting question is: why would fishermen lobby for rules that lead to overcapitalization? In
other words, wouldn't fishermen want to work in a profitable fishery? The answer to this
question can be found in two key features of fishing culture. First, fishermen are extremely
competitive and take great pride in their ability to outwork and out-think their peers. Rules that
prevent full competition are disfavored. But, rules that fail to prevent competition lead to
overinvestment by sanctioning the race for fish. Second, fishermen believe in providing free
access to fisheries for those who want to fish. The idea behind this philosophy is based on the
centuries-old legal and cultural tradition of open access as well as on the fear that one day, they
themselves might be excluded from participating in a fishery they wish to join.
162. See supra note 160. At first glance, American Pelagic seems to refute the prediction
that fishermen can subdue threats to their investments through the political process. After all,
the plaintiff was not able to prevent Congress from barring the Atlantic Star from the herring
and mackerel fisheries. Although the fishermen who opposed the Atlantic Star, and their
congressional allies, spun the dispute as a battle between conservation and a large trawler, it is
more accurately viewed as a battle between fishermen with small vessels and one fisherman with
a large vessel. In this light, the case provides support for, or at least does not disprove, the
hypothesis that fishermen will organize to fend off threats to their economic well-being and that
they will often succeed in that endeavor.
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Ill. HOW CONGRESS HAS EXACERBATED THE PROBLEMS
INHERENT IN GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP
The two problems described above-government's dual role and the
embedding of lobbying entrepreneurs -are inherent in government
ownership of fishery resources. The holding of American Pelagic
highlights the investment insecurity that drives fishermen's lobbying. As
discussed further in Part IV, any government hoping to achieve
sustainable fisheries, without catching the fish itself, would have to take
these issues into account in designing a management regime. In this Part,
I describe a few examples of how past and current U.S. fisheries laws
instead exacerbate these problems. One example, the provision of
subsidies and loan guarantees, illustrates how law can alter fishermen's
incentives in ways that make conservation more difficult. Another, the
Regional Fishery Management Council Systems, shows how law can
make it easier for resource users to have their concerns heard, to the
detriment of the resource.
A. Subsidies and Loan Guarantees
When Congress passed the Magnuson-Stevens Act in 1976,163 it
barred foreign vessels from fishing within 200 nautical miles of the shores
of the United States."6 Foreseeing a need to replace that fishing capacity,
Congress instituted two large-scale subsidy programs in the early 1970s.
The Capital Construction Fund permitted the owners of fishing vessels to
stow pre-tax fishing income in bank accounts. If this income were
ultimately used for the renovation of an existing fishing vessel, or for the
purchase of a new one, then it would never be taxed as income.
163. Pub. L. No. 94-265, 90 Stat. 331 (1976). The law was originally known simply as the
Fishery Conservation and Management Act. In 1980, Congress renamed it the Magnuson
Fishery Conservation and Management Act; in 1996, it became the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery
Conservation and Management Act. Pub. L. No. 96-561, 94 Stat. 3275 (1980); Pub. L. No. 104-
208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996).
164. The original Act accomplished this by creating a 200-nautical-mile Fishery
Conservation Zone around the United States. Pub. L. No. 94-265, § 101; see also MICHAEL L.
WEBER, FROM ABUNDANCE TO SCARCITY: A HISTORY OF U.S. MARINE FISHERIES POLICY 84
(2002). (A nautical mile is 1.15 miles.) Foreign fishermen could operate in the zone only with
permission of the U.S. government. Id. In 1983, President Reagan eliminated the Fishery
Conservation Zone when he claimed a 200-nautical-mile Exclusive Economic Zone for the
United States. Proclamation No. 5030, 48 Fed. Reg. 10,605 (Mar. 14, 1983). The United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea established a 200-nautical -mile Exclusive Economic Zones for
coastal nations. Art. 62, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397, 421. The United States has not yet
ratified this treaty. The United States' claim to an Exclusive Economic Zone is presumably
based on the theory that these rights at some point became customary international law.
The Magnuson-Stevens Act now provides that "the United States claims, and will
exercise in the manner provided for in this Act, sovereign rights and exclusive fishery
management authority over all fish, and all Continental Shelf fishery resources, within the
exclusive economic zone .. " 16 U.S.C. § 1811(a) (2006).
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Fishermen made substantial use of this tax exemption. According to
Michael Weber, vessel owners "sheltered more than $1.82 billion in
income" under this program and used the funds to significantly increase
fishing capacity.165 A second program, the Fishing Vessel Obligation
Guarantee (FOG) Program, provided federal guarantees for loans for the
purchase of new vessels and for the upgrading of existing vessels. Federal
guarantees encouraged investment in vessels by lowering interest rates
and by relieving private lenders from the burden of investigating the
financial wisdom of their loans. Weber estimates that "the FOG program
guaranteed 1,250 loans for fishing vessels amounting to $728 million.""
These programs were consistent with the concept of government-as-
facilitator. By reducing the costs of entry into fisheries, Congress was
attempting to stimulate investment in fisheries and to make it easier for
U.S. fishermen to compete with heavily subsidized foreign fleets.167
Unfortunately, while "[i]n most industries, reductions in the cost of inputs
improve a firm's financial position and increase production[,] in the
fishing industry such reductions in costs do not last long, and attempts to
produce a larger catch eventually lead to smaller harvests because of
fisheries depletion."1" These dynamics have a negative impact on
conservation. As fishing costs rise and profits decline, vessel owners have
more incentive to protest conservation measures. The marginal costs of
conservation are higher in fisheries in which fishermen are barely making
a profit.
Government-guaranteed loans, such as the FOG, create a direct
conflict of interest between government-as-regulator and government-as-
facilitator. In the absence of these guarantees, the government is
"merely" chasing fishermen out of the fishery when it cuts catch levels in
the name of conservation. Once it guarantees fishermen's loans, the
government must either forego conservation measures or cover the cost
of widespread defaults.
B. The Regional Fishery Management Council System
When Congress created the Fishery Conservation Zone in 1976, it
needed an institution for managing fisheries within that zone. Instead of
giving this chore to a federal agency, Congress created a system of eight
Regional Fishery Management Councils.169 Under the Magnuson-Stevens
Act, the councils have primary responsibility for all of the most important
165. WEBER, supra note 164, at 34-35.
166. Id.
167. MARGARET E. DEWAR, INDUSTRY IN TROUBLE: THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND
NEW ENGLAND FISHERIES 191 (1983).
168. Id.
169. 16 U.S.C. § 1852(a).
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decisions in federal fishery management: the councils choose which
fisheries to manage, 7 ° draft the FMPs for managing those species, 71 write
rules and regulations for each fishery,'72 and set limits on the amount of
fish that can be caught each year.'73
The councils, though, are not federal agencies. Instead, their voting
membership is made up mostly of state government officials and citizens
who have been nominated by governors of coastal states, then appointed
by the Secretary of Commerce.' Traditionally, governors draw heavily
from fishing or fishing-related industries in making council
nominations. 175 Over the past twenty years, industry representatives have
filled, on average, about 80 percent of appointed seats. 176 This "citizen"
component of the councils represents about half the overall voting
membership of each council.
77
Several papers have argued that industry domination of the councils
interferes with the conservation objectives of the Magnuson-Stevens
Act. 178 Homogenous groups tend to suffer from what has been called
"groupthink," a phenomenon that limits groups' ability to incorporate
new information and to engage in creative problem solving.179 In addition,
170. Id. § 1852(h) (requiring councils to regulate "each fishery under its authority that
requires conservation and management"). The councils retain significant discretion in the
determination of whether the fishery meets these conditions.
171. Id.
172. Id. § 1853(a)(1).
173. Prior to the 2006 amendments to the Magnuson-Stevens Act, the law did not require
the councils to put explicit limits on the amount of each species of fish caught each year. If a
council chose to use a Total Allowable Catch or annual quota management scheme, then
obviously it would have to set an explicit limit. On the other hand, if the council chose to use
another kind of management scheme, such as a scheme centered on limiting effort in the fishery,
then it did not have to set an explicit limit. In the 2006 amendments, Congress added a provision
requiring that the councils set explicit limits for each fishery they manage by the year 2010 for
overfished fisheries, and by 2011 for the remainder. Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation
and Management Reauthorization Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-479, § 104(b), 120 Stat. 3575,
3584 (2007) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1853 (a)(15) (2006)).
174. The number of members on each council varies, depending on the number of states and
U.S. territories bordering the managed area. The largest council in terms of membership is the
Mid-Atlantic Council, with twenty-one voting members, while the Caribbean Council has only
seven. There is one federal government official on each council, typically the regional director of
the NMFS. 16 U.S.C. § 1852 (a)-(b) (2006). Each council also has a number of nonvoting
members, including representatives of the Coast Guard, the State Department, and the U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service. Id. § 1852(c).
175. JOSH EAGLE ET AL., TAKING STOCK OF THE REGIONAL FISHERY MANAGEMENT
COUNCILS 12 box 3 (2003); Thomas A. Okey, Membership of the Eight Regional Fishery
Management Councils in the United States. Are Special Interests Over-Represented?, 27
MARINE POL'Y 193 (2003).
176. EAGLE, supra note 175, at 24. The Magnuson-Stevens Act specifically exempts the
councils from the Federal Advisory Committee Act and its diversity requirements. 16 U.S.C. §
1852(i).
177. 16 U.S.C. § 1852(b)(2)(A).
178. Eagle et al., supra note 20; Okey, supra note 175.
179. EAGLE, supra note 175, at XX nn.39-41.
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because they are financially invested in the fisheries they manage, council
members drawn from the fishing industry may have conflicts of interest
that make conservation personally expensive. Unlike federal employees
generally, fishery management council members are not subject to
stringent conflict-of-interest rules."0
At the very least, the high concentration of industry representatives
on the councils exacerbates the problems of government ownership. The
presence of industry representatives on the councils increases the
likelihood that the councils will be sympathetic to the financial concerns
of fishermen. Even if they have no direct financial interest in the fishery,
it seems plausible to conclude that industry members will readily
empathize with their fishing colleagues.
IV. MAKING GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP WORK
How might Congress modify the Magnuson-Stevens Act so as to
take into account the predictable obstacles to efficiency and sustainability
caused by investment insecurity and lobbying?181 This Part explores some
of the options available to legislators interested in making government
ownership a better "mimic" of private ownership along these two
dimensions.'8 2
First, Congress might attempt to limit NMFS' and the councils'
ability to yield to industry lobbying pressure by reducing their discretion
under the Magnuson-Stevens Act. For example, the law might mandate
that regulators "must prevent overfishing" instead of that they "should
180. See 16 U.S.C. § 1852(i)-(j) (2006). For a full discussion of the conflict-of-interest issue
as it pertains to fishery management council members, see EAGLE, supra note 175, at 27-32.
181. Matthew Zinn refers to these kinds of approaches as "statutory anti-capture measures."
Matthew D. Zinn, Policing Environmental Regulatory Enforcement: Cooperation, Capture, and
Citizen Suits, 21 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 81, 84 (2002). I prefer to avoid the term "capture" because it
implies complete cooption of the regulator. In my view, the success of government ownership is
threatened by any divergence from the management path a sole owner would take.
182. See NEHER, supra note 18. Of course, one way to avoid the challenge of mimicking
private ownership would be to sell the oceans into private ownership. I am choosing to avoid
discussion of the benefits and drawbacks of complete ocean privatization in this Article. Suffice
it to say that privatization would likely face significant opposition from both fishermen and the
general public. First, privatization of the eas is contrary to cultural and legal traditions of public
access. For thousands of years, those interested in making a living from fishing, or in enjoying
recreational fishing, have been free to do so, subject only to some degree of regulation. The right
to access the seas for transportation and resource use is at the core of the public trust doctrine.
See Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial
Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REv. 471, 484-85 (1970).
Environmentalists, too, would likely oppose privatization, even with its promise of
better conservation of fish stocks. Many of the ocean assets that environmentalists are likely to
value highly, such as endangered species, coral reefs, and healthy ecosystems, are not valued
highly in the commodity marketplace. See, e.g., Alison Rieser, Prescriptions for the Commons:
Environmental Scholarsip and the Fishing Quotas Debate, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 393, 414-
17 (1999).
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try to prevent overfishing." Alas, the law already says this: National
Standard One of the Act provides that NMFS and the councils "shall
prevent overfishing."'83 Given that they are already required to do so,
why don't the councils prevent overfishing? The reason is that fisheries
science is characterized by a great deal of uncertainty, such that the only
way to be 100 percent certain of ending overfishing is to ban fishing
altogether. Thus, as a practical matter, the councils debate the word
"shall" in terms of probability." For example, in Natural Resources
Defense Council v. Daley, the Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management
Council made a determination that a fishing level with a 3 percent chance
of ending overfishing was sufficient to satisfy National Standard One's
"shall" mandate. While the court ultimately rejected 3 percent as an
insufficient level of certainty, it did not go further than requiring 51
percent as minimally acceptable.1
8 5
If Congress wanted to reduce NMFS' and the councils' discretionary
space in this area, it would have to construct a standard that mandated
regulators to be X percent certain that a particular measure will end
overfishing. As noted, a 100 percent certainty standard would mean that
many, if not all, fisheries would be closed. While Congress could mandate
a higher level of certainty than 51 percent, it is likely that motivated
regulators could easily circumvent such a rule. For example, regulators
retain significant discretion in weighting various pieces of scientific advice
and in choosing between various models available for simulating
population dynamics."
Furthermore, the ambiguous nature of language will almost always
permit motivated regulators to shape decisions.'87 Words in laws are often
open to a variety of interpretations."s So, for example, while Congress
has defined the term "overfishing" and "overfished" in the Magnuson-
Stevens Act as "a rate or level of fishing mortality that jeopardizes the
capacity of a fishery to produce the maximum sustainable yield on a
183. 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(1) (2006).
184. See. e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council v. Daley, 209 F.3d 747 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
185. Id.
186. See, e.g., SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS DIV., U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMM.
ON GOVERNMENT REFORM-MINORITY STAFF, POLITICS AND SCIENCE IN THE BUSH
ADMINISTRATION (2003); Robert F. Kennedy Jr., The Junk Science of George W Bush,
NATION, Mar. 8, 2004, at 11 (alleging that Bush Administration environmental officials
"suppress good science... [or] simply order up their own").
187. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Unmet Expectations. Undue Restriction of the Reasonable
Expectations Approach and the Misleading Mythology of Judicial Role, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 181,
234 (1998).
188. Lawrence M. Solan, Why Laws Work Pretty Well, but Not Great.- Words and Rules in
Legal Interpretation, 26 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 243 (2001).
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continuing basis," the NMFS and the councils have leeway in determining
whether or not those conditions exist.8 9
Congress could attack the problem by imposing requirements on
regulators themselves. The law could, for example, require that council
members take oaths, swearing to act "in a manner consistent with the
long-term health of the resource." Although such oaths might provide
some incentive for regulators to act differently, the efficacy of oaths in
constraining the behavior of administrative officials has not been well
established."9
Congress might also consider enhancing diversity on the councils. It
could do this by eliminating the councils' current exemption from the
Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA),1 9' or by simply mandating
that the NMFS assemble each council to reflect a defined composition of
industry, public interest, and other interests. The main problem here is
that diversity provisions, such as those in the FACA, have proven to be
mostly nonjusticiable. 92 Limited judicial review leaves the final judgment
about diversity to the agency, which would of course be subject to
lobbying pressure in making its choices.
As an alternative to regulating the regulators, Congress might opt to
limit the effects of industry lobbying by changing the procedural rules.
Congress could make it easier for the public, or groups that represent the
diffuse interests of the public, to influence decisions. This could be
accomplished through a change in rules governing council composition,193
by making it easier for members of the public to challenge regulators'
decisions in court, 94 or by creating a watchdog agency whose only
189. 16 U.S.C. § 1853(a)(10) (2006); see also MARINE FISH CONSERVATION NETWORK,
SHELL GAME: HOW THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IS HIDING MISMANAGEMENT OF OUR
NATIONS FISHERIES 6 (2006), available at http://www.conservefish.org/site/pubs/
network-reports/ (reporting that NMFS removes stocks from "overfished" list through
administrative actions).
190. See, e.g., Sherman J. Clar, The Scholarship of Sanford Levinson: Promise, Prayer, and
Identity, 38 TULSA L. REV. 579 (2003); Jerry L. Mashaw, Recovering American Administrative
Law: Federalist Foundations, 1787-1801, 115 YALE L.J. 1256, 1309-10 (2006).
191. See supra note 176.
192. See, e.g., Pub. Citizen v. Nat'l Advisory Comm. on Microbiological Criteria for Foods,
886 F.2d 419, 426 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Fertilizer Inst. v. EPA, 938 F. Supp. 52, 53 (D.D.C. 1996). But
see Cargill, Inc. v. United States, 173 F.3d 323 (5th Cir. 1999). For discussion of the problems in
mandating diversity, see EAGLE, supra note 175, at 40.
193. The Magnuson-Stevens Act currently requires only that governors nominate, and the
Secretary of Commerce appoint, council members who "by reason of their occupational or other
experience, scientific expertise, or training, are knowledgeable regarding the conservation and
management, or the commercial or recreational harvest, of the fishery resources of the
geographical area concerned" and that "[tihe Secretary, in making appointments under this
section, shall, to the extent practicable, ensure a fair and balanced apportionment, on a rotating
or other basis, of the active participants (or their representatives) in the commercial and
recreational fisheries under the jurisdiction of the Council." 16 U.S.C. § 1852(b)(2)(A)-(B).
194. Barton H. Thompson Jr., Innovations in Environmental Policy- the Continuing
Innovation of Citizen Enforcement, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 185 (2000). For example, Congress
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responsibility would be to lobby the councils and the NMFS toward
better decisions.
195
Perhaps the most promising avenue would be to change fishermen's
incentives so that they are less interested in lobbying against
conservation. There are at least three possible means to effecting this
change. First, some recent scholarship has examined the extent to which
market-based mechanisms can encourage private actors to take a
sustainable view.196 Individual fishing quotas, for example, give fishermen
long-term stakes in catch shares.' 97 Guaranteed the future benefits of
present forbearance, fishermen are apt to be less focused on maximizing
short-term revenues. 198 Another possibility is labeling. The Marine
Stewardship Council currently runs a program that permits fishermen to
label their products as "sustainably caught" if they can prove, as a group,
that their fishery is well managed.' 99 To the extent that fishermen believe
that such labels bring higher prices for their catches, they have an
incentive to lobby for better management. Government sponsorship or
endorsement of such labeling programs might make them more
effective.2" Finally, risk insurance has the potential to influence
fishermen's incentives.2 1 Insurance might reduce the frequency and
could extend the statute of limitation for challenges or the standard of review that courts use in
reviewing fisheries decisions. Currently, citizens must challenge the legality of FMPs,
amendments, or regulations within thirty days of the publication of the final rule in the Federal
Register. 16 U.S.C. § 1855(f). The standard of review applied by courts in these cases is the
"arbitrary and capricious" standard contained in the Administrative Procedure Act. Id
195. In support of the proposition that environmental agencies can influence other kinds of
agencies, see J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Public Agencies as Lobbyists, 105 COLUM. L. REV.
2217 (2005). It would also be possible to create agencies solely for the purpose of representing a
certain interest, such as conservation, in decision-making processes. An example, in another
context, would be the New Jersey Department of the Public Advocate. See State of New Jersey,
Dep't of the Public Advocate, About the Department, http://www.state.nj.us/publicadvocate/
about/ (last visited Apr. 6, 2007).
196. Susan S. Hanna, Institutions for Marine Ecosystems: Economic Incentives and Fishery
Management, 8 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS S170 (1998).
197. The Magnuson-Stevens Act provides that the councils may make use of individual
fishing quotas in managing fisheries. 16 U.S.C. § 1853A (2006). To date, however, only a handful
of fisheries in the United States make use of this tool. SUZANNE IUDICELLO ET AL., FISH,
MARKETS, FISHERMEN 89-159 (1999). In December of 2006, Congress passed the Magnuson-
Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Reauthorization Act of 2006. Pub. L. No. 109-
479, 120 Stat. 3575 (2007). This bill contained provisions that will perhaps make the use of
individual quotas (known in the bill as "Limited Access Privileges") more common.
198. Wilen, supra note 22.
199. Douglas H. Constance & Alessandro Bonanno, Regulating the global fisheries: The
World Wildlife Fund, Unilever, and the Marine Stewardship Council, 17 AGRIC. & HUM.
VALUES 125 (2000).
200. Matthew Connolly, Thinking Globally, Acting Locally: Cleaning up Global
Aquaculture Through Eco-labeling in the United States, 26 PUB. LAND & RES. L. REv. 121
(2005).
201. Andrea Bender et al., Informal Insurance and Sustainable Management of Common-
Pool Marine Resources in Ha 'apai, Tonga, 50 ECON. DEv. & CULTURAL CHANGE 427 (2001).
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traction of fishermen's arguments that costly conservation measures
damage them economically. The government could require that
fishermen purchase this insurance prior to entering the fishery."2
CONCLUSION
American Pelagic stands for the proposition that it is virtually
impossible for a resource user to protect his or her investment in fishing
equipment through the Takings Clause. It also symbolizes the awkward
and historically deleterious relationship between the entrepreneur and
the state in regulated commons such as fisheries. While the economic
literature suggests that government ownership of natural resources can
solve the tragedy of the commons, government ownership is substantially
different from private ownership. In order for government ownership to
succeed, management institutions must take into account the incentives
of the entrepreneurs embedded within them.
Of course the Magnuson-Stevens Act itself, and in particular the
council system, reflects the political dynamics of fishing, where fishermen
as a "concentrated" interest have more influence than the public as a
whole. There is a thus a problem of circularity: in order to revamp the
Act so that it takes into account the incentives of concentrated group
members, it will be necessary to overcome the likely opposition of that
group. The existence of the council system provides a good reminder that
the industry lobbies Congress as well as agencies for rules that benefit it.
As long as the public remains relatively indifferent to marine
environmental issues, Congress is unlikely to make the necessary changes
to the Act. It may ultimately be left to fishermen to decide whether they
are in favor of efficient and sustainable fisheries.
202. We would have to keep a close eye on rates: rates would undoubtedly remain lower to
the extent that fishermen obviated the need for claims-by lobbying against conservation.
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